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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1958
Survey of Ohio Law-1958
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE
Agency Authority
An administrative agency operates under a basic statute which is the
source of its authority. Authority to license must be predicated upon a
valid basis in that statute. The power of the Ohio Board of Real Estate
Examiners to deny admission to an examination for a broker's license
was challenged by an attack upon the constitutionality of the authorizing
statute.' The statute set out two methods whereby an applicant could
qualify for a broker's examination: (1) a minimum of one year's experi-
ence full time in real estate business or service or the equivalent as de-
termined by the Board or (2) the completion of specified courses in real
estate approved by the Board in an "approved college or university," in
lieu of experience. The applicant could not meet either test, and his
request was denied.2 The principal attack upon the statute was that it
was arbitrary, capricious, oppressive, and denied equal protection of the
law. In affirming the action of the Board and the lower court, the court
of appeals held that the enactment of the statute was justified as a reas-
onable regulatory measure within the proper exercise of the police power,
and that it was neither arbitrary, unreasonable nor discriminatory.
As occasionally happens, a court of- appeals decision. is reported after
a general affirmance by the Supreme Court. There is such a situation in
the reporting of a decision holding valid the maximum premium pro-
visions of the Ohio Retail Installment Act.3 The affirming Supreme
Court decision 4 was the subject of comment in a previous survey,5 and
the court of appeals decision is mentioned here because of its relationship
to the authority of the Motor Vehicle Dealers' and Salesmen's Licensing
Board.6 The court of appeals7 held that the maximum premium pro-
visions of the installment sales statute applies to retail automobile dealers.
1. OHIo REv. CoDE§ 4735.07.
2. Io re Russo, 150 N.E.2d 327 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958). See also CONSTTIONAL
LAW section, infra.
3. OHIo REv. CODE § 1317.08.
4. Teegardin v. Foley, 166 Ohio St. 449, 143 N.E.2d 824 (1957).
5. 1957 Survey, 9 WEST. REs. L. REv. 277, 359 (1958).
6. OHIO REV. CODE § 4517.12 authorizes the Board to suspend or revoke any li-
cense if the licensee has in any manner violated any law relating to the selling or
regulating of sales of motor vehicles.
7. Teegardin v. Foley, 148 N.E.2d 252 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956), aff'd 166 Ohio St.
449, 143 N.E.2d 824 (1957).
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Since the limitations of the Act were valid, a violation of its provisions
subjected the 'dealer to suspension or revocation of his license by the
Board.
Another licensee under suspension for violationof a regulation of the
Ohio Board of Liquor Control fixing the minimum prices which might
be charged for wines, challenged the validity of the regulation. The
court of appeals8 and the Supreme Court of Ohio9 both affirmed the
common pleas' order of suspension, against the charge that the Ohio statute 0
unlawfully interferes with interstate commerce and delegates authority to
an administrative agency without proper standards, and also the charge
that the regulation involved is arbitrary and unreasonable.
The 21st amendment abrogated the commerce clause to the extent
that the federal constitution no longer restricts the power of a state to
control the traffic in liquor." Also a state's control of its liquor in-
dustry is not subject to the constitutional limitations normally operative in
the exercise of its general police power.12  Previously, the Supreme Court
of Ohio had determined that persons may engage in the liquor traffic
"only to the extent to which they are permitted to do so."' 3 The Gen-
eral Assembly may therefore delegate a very broad discretion to the Board
of Liquor Control to fix minimum prices without any appreciable stand-
ards, and the existing regulations which fix the minimum prices for
bottled wines in Ohio are valid.
In many areas of administrative activity, the most effective method of
enforcement is through physical inspection. In a decision 14 of great
significance to administrative officials, the Supreme Court upheld a muni-
cipal ordinance' 5 which authorized the city housing inspector to make
8. Pompei Winery, Inc. v. Board of Liquor Control, 149 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1956). See also CONSTITUTIONAL LAW section, infra.
9. Pompei Winery, Inc. v. Board of Liquor Control, 167 Ohio St. 61, 146 N.E.
430 (1957), cer. denied 356 U.S. 937 (1958).
10. OiO REV. CODE § 4301.13.
11. State Board of Equalization v. Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59 (1936).
12. Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939). The police power as to this
subject matter seems as broad as the taxing power of the state.
13. State ex rel. Sugravu v. O'Brien, 130 Ohio St. 23, 26, 196 N.E. 664, 666
(1935).
14. State ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 168 Ohio St. 123, 151 N.E. 523 (1958). See dis-
cussion under CONSTITUTIONAL LAW section, infra.
15. The City of Dayton ordinance authorized the Division of Housing Inspection
to enter and survey the premises for the purpose of repaire or alterations as are neces-
sary to comply with the provisions of the minimum housing standards. There had
been no complaint against the relator's house, but an effort had been made to inspect
and each time the inspectors had been turned back because they had no search war-
rant. Finally relator was arrested and jailed in lieu of bond. He was released by
the court of common pleas on a writ of habeas corpus, after a holding that the or-
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inspections of, and provided free access to, private dwellings upon his
presentation of proper identification at any reasonable hour. The de-
fendant charged for refusing admission to the inspector had, of course,
contended that the ordinance infringed the provision of Article I, Sec-
tion 14, Ohio Constitution which prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures.
The far-reaching implication of this decision in support of inspec-
tion powers is illustrated by the following quotation from the court's
opinion:
The right of a home owner to the inviolability of his 'castle' should
be subordinate to the general health and safety of the community where
he lives.'
Exclusive Administrative Jurisdiction
A recurrent problem of federal-state relationship in the labor relations
field is the determination of the scope of the exclusive jurisdiction of
the National Labor Relations Board, precluding state judicial action. In
a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the federal
agency's jurisdiction over unfair labor practices does not preclude an
Ohio court from exercising jurisdiction over an action to recover dam-
ages for a common-law tort based upon a conspiracy between a union
and its officials which deprives the plaintiff of his right to earn a living
and to interfere with his employment contract.17
Concurrent Jurisdiction
In an annexation proceeding the plaintiff sought to enjoin any further
action on the part of a board of county commissioners in connection with
annexation of territory to the City of Columbus. The basis for this suit
was action taken by the Board of Township Trustees authorizing an elec-
tion in the disputed territory. The incorporation into a village was
approved at this election which was held, however, prior to the final
determination of the County Commissioners that the territory instead be
annexed to an adjacent city. However, a petition had been filed with
the County Commissioners and action taken to hold a hearing prior to
dinance was unconstitutional and void. In the court of common pleas this judgment
was reversed. State ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 105 Ohio App. 376, 152 N.E.2d 776(1957).
16. For a full comment on the Supreme Court decision see 10 WEst. Rus L. Ruv.
304 (1959).
17. Perko v. Local No. 207, 168 Ohio St. 161, 151 N.E.2d 742 (1958). The
Common Pleas Court had dismissed the petitions and the Court of Appeals had af-
firmed. On motion to certify, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. See dis-
cussion in LABOR LAW section, infra.
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the petition filed with the township trustees. Injunction was therefore
denied 8 under the rule that the first of two administrative bodies having
concurrent authority has exclusive authority thereafter.19
Agency Proceedings - Necessity for Findings
The Ohio Insurance Superintendent, after notice and hearing, revoked
the license of an individual as an accident and health insurance agent.
The individual appealed to the court of common pleas in accordance with
the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act.20 That court revoked the Super-
intendent's order and restored the agent's license, based upon the deter-
mination that the order was not in accordance with law since it did not
recite nor contain a finding of fact upon which it was based. The court
of appeals affirmed2 ' the judgment of the court of common pleas and
approved the view of the trial court that the administrative action was
contrary to law.
Entrapment
Ever since the court of appeals held that entrapment may be em-
ployed as a defense to a charge preferred against a permittee by the
Director of Liquor Control,22 there have been recurrent efforts to defeat
Board of Liquor Control suspension and revocation orders by this means.
One appeal on this ground is reported.23 The court therein held that the
facts were insufficient to establish entrapment.
Judicial Review - Agency Rule Making
Under the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act24 a person aggrieved
by a regulation of an administrative agency to which the Act applies,
18. Lamneck v. Cain, 154 N.E.2d 99 (Ohio C.P. 1955). The Court relies upon
a prior decision of the Supreme Court, State ex rel. Ferris v. Shaver, 163 Ohio St.
325, 126 N.E.2d 915 (1955). See 1955 Survey, 7 WEST. RES. L REV. 222 (1956).
19. The foundation for this rule resolving administrative jurisdiction is Trum-
bull County Board of Education v. State ex rel. Van Wye, 122 Ohio St. 247, 171
N.E. 241 (1930).
20. OHIo REV. CODE § 119.12.
21. Bretscher v. Robinson, 153 N.E.2d 163 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956). Previously
the appellee had unsuccessfully attempted to have the appeal dismissed and the judg-
ment affirmed because of the appellants' failure to file a bill of exceptions. The
motion was denied because a legal question (necessity for findings) was raised by
the judgment entry. Bretscher v. Robinson 142 N.E.2d 238 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955).
22. Langdon v. Board of Liquor Control, 98 Ohio App. 535, 130 N.E.2d 430
(1954).
23. Ray v. Board of Liquor Control, 154 N.E.2d 89 (Ohio App. 1958); affirming
the trial court's decision, 154 N.E.2d 27 (Ohio C.P. 1957).
24. OHIo REv. CODE § 119.11.
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may appeal from the adoption of the regulation to the Court of Com-
mon Pleas of Franklin County. A court of appeals decision25 considered
the nature of this appeal and determined the effect of filing a motion
for a new trial in the common pleas court. The appeal from the adop-
tion of the regulation is an error proceeding unlike the appeal26 provided
from "orders" of the administrative agency wherein the court appraises all
the evidence as to credibility of witnesses, the probative character and
weight to be given the evidence. Despite this difference the court held
that the motion for a new trial filed in the common pleas court had the
effect under the Appellate Procedure Act27 of tolling the time for appeal,
and it was therefore mandatory that the common pleas court decide the
motion for a new trial.
Appeal By the Administrative Agency
Despite the apparent broad language of the Code giving the adminis-
trative agency a right to appeal an adverse decision of the initial review-
ing court,28 the restrictive construction by the Supreme Court0 9 limiting
the right of agency appeal under the Administrative Procedure Act to
questions of law relating to the constitutionality, construction, or inter-
pretation of statutes and the rules and regulations of the agency, prevents
appeals by the agency on exclusively questions of fact. For example the
agency may not appeal from the decision of the common pleas court
that its order is not supported by reliable, probative and substantial evi-
dence.30 Nor may it appeal when -the question is one of mixed law and
fact, when the issue of law involved is a matter of common law rather
than statutory law, as in the defense of entrapment.31
Judicial Review of Evidentiary Matters
Under the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act32 the common pleas
court is required to determine whether the order of the agency is sup-
25. 1- re Appeal from Board of Liquor Control, 103 Ohio App. 517, 146 N.E.2d
309 (1957).
26. OHmo REv. CODE § 119.12.
27. Omio REv. CoDE § 2505.07.
28. OHIO REv. CODE § 119.12: "Such appeals may be taken either by the party
or the agency and shall proceed as in the case of appeals in civil actions... ."
29. Katz v. Department of Liquor Control, 166 Ohio St. 229, 141 N.E.2d 294
(1957), see comment in 9 WEsT. REs. L. REv. 251, 254-256 (1958).
30. Mangold v. Board of Liquor Control, 150 N.E.2d 461 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
In a per curiam decision, upon a motion to dismiss the appeal, the court held that it
did not have jurisdiction because the only issue raised was factual.
31. Gay v. Board of Liquor Control, 106 Ohio App. 59, 151 N.E.2d 686 (1958).
Entrapment is a common law and not a statutory rule of evidence.
32. Omio RE. CODE § 119.12.
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ported 'by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence. If the court fails
to find that the order is supported by such evidence, it is proper to
remand the cause to the agency for further hearing. 3 When, however,
there is an appellate review of the common pleas decision, the appellate
court reviews the action of the lower court in the same manner as on
appeals in other civil actions, determining merely whether the judge
could have found from the evidence before him in the manner he in fact
did. 4
In a number of agencies, there is provision for intra-agency appeal.
For example, the suspension orders of the Director of Liquor Control are
appealable to the Board of Liquor Control. Upon such an appeal, the
rules of civil actions apply. Thus the usual presumptions are available
to the Board and to a reviewing court, in determining the correctness of
the decision of the Director.3 5 Also upon appeal to the Board the ap-
pellant must be accorded the right to a hearing which entitles him to
present testimony for the consideration of the Board. Unless its decision
is supported by evidence relevant to the issues presented on the appeal,
a reviewing court is bound to hold that its order is not supported by re-
liable, substantial and probative evidence.38
The mandatory nature of the hearing accorded by the reviewing court
on an appeal under the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act3 7 continues
to be the subject of debate, although the courts have uniformly held that
the court of common pleas is required to read and consider all the evi-
dence before passing on the merits of the appeal, and it is therefore
error for that court to dismiss an appeal and affirm an order of the
Board of Liquor Control without a hearing or even notice of the time for
a hearing.38  When a full hearing is accorded in the court of common
pleas that court may affirm the agency on the merits but modify the
agency's order relative to the penalty imposed.39 It is clear that addi-
tional evidence beyond the record of the agency proceeding must be
offered, if at all, to the court of common pleas, and it is too late to urge
the offer of additional evidence for the first time in the appellate court.
In the absence of an offer of additional evidence, a hearing upon the ad-
33. Cipriano v. Board of Liquor Control, 152 N.E.2d 176 (Ohio C.P. 1956).
34. Cheh v. Board of Liquor Control, 152 N.E.2d 548 (Ohio Ct App. 1956).
35. B.P.O. of Elks v. Board of Liquor Control, 105 Ohio App. 181, 151 N.E.2d 693
(1957).
36. Khoury v. Board of Liquor Control, 153 N.E.2d 335 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
37. Omio REv. CODE § 119.12.
38. Contris v. Board of Liquor Control, 105 Ohio App. 287, 152 N.E.2d 327
(1957).
39. Jenkins v. Board of Real Estate Examiners, 152 N.E.2d 282 (Ohio Ct. App.
1958). The Court of Common Pleas changed the order from a revocation of license
to a suspension for one year.
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ministrative record in common pleas court is the "full hearing' which
the Act contemplates.40
The appeal provided in the Administrative Procedure Act from the
judgment of the common pleas court to the court of appeals is limited to
questions of law only. Thus a notice of appeal which states that the
appeal is taken on questions of law and fact, as against a motion to
strike, will ,be retained as an appeal on questions of law only.41 Such
an appellant must conform to the usual rules of the court of appeals con-
cerning assignments of error and ,briefs.42 This means also that questions
presented for the consideration of the court of appeals must be presented
in the original assignment of error, and new questions may not be in-
jected on a motion for reconsideration.43
The court of appeals also has jurisdiction under the Ohio Adminis-
trative Procedure Act4 4 to reverse, vacate or modify the judgment on
appeal. Thus in reviewing an order of the Board of Real Estate Ex-
aminers revoking an agent's license, the court changed the ameliorated
order to a suspension for 30 days.4 5
Judicial Review Under Special Sfatutes
A "civil action" brought in common pleas court challenged the ai-
thority of the Ohio State Racing Commission to deny the owner of race
horses the right to enter 'his horses for the remainder of a race meeting
for alleged infraction of the Commission's rule against creating a "dis-
turbance' at a track 0  It should be noted that the Horse Racing Act,
vesting authority in the Commission, is silent on the question of judicial
review. 47 While there is no discussion of the basis for the action in the
principal case, the administrative action in question was in the nature of
a license suspension. This is an instance where the section of the Ohio
40. City Products Corp. v. Board of Liquor Control, 153 N.E.2d 153 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1958).
41. Arvay v. Board of Liquor Control, 104 Ohio App. 208, 148 N.E.2d 81 (1957).
42. Lester v. Board of Liquor Control, 150 N.E.2d 89 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
43. Alessandro v. Board of Liquor Control, 105 Ohio App. 521, 153 N.E.2d 174
(1957).
44. OHIO REv. CODE § 119.12.
45. Carpenter v. Sinclair, 149 N.E.2d 150 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958). The court
felt that the evidence did not warrant such harsh treatment. The modification of
the order may therefore be characterized as a correction of an abuse of discretion.
46. Fischbach v. Ohio State Racing Comm'n, 147 N.E.2d 258 (Ohio Ct. App.
1955). The common pleas court sustained the order of the Commission. While
the Administrative Procedure Act was not mentioned in the appellate court's opinion,
it did reverse the lower court's judgment and rendered final judgment for the
plaintiff.
47. Oa-io Rnv. CODE § 3769.01-99.
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Administrative Procedure Act applicable to the licensing authority48 of
any state administrative officer or agency provides a-judicial review of
the action taken.49
Administrative decisions outside the "licensing" area and not rendered
by an "agency" subject to the Administrative Procedure Act are review-
able in accordance with the specific statutory provisions governing the
specific agency. A number of decisions illustrate judicial review under
specific agency statutes.
A township Board of Zoning Appeals, for example, may authorize a
variance from the terms of a zoning ordinance. The Board's decision on
the denial of a petition for a variance is subject to review in the court of
common pleas5" and reversal if it is found that the denial was unreason-
able.51
Since the inclusion in the Ohio Revised Code 2 of provisions for
judicial review of the decisions of any agency which is in addtion to any
other remedy of appeal provided by law, this alternative remedy would
appear to be more adequate. The Teviewing court is authorized to take
appropriate action if it finds that the agency order is "unsupported by
the preponderance of substantial, reliable and probative evidence on the
whole record."53
Under prior law a dismissed employee of a city fire or police depart-
ment was entitled to a judicial review of the action taken by the munici-
pal civil service commission affirming this dismissal by appeal to the
court of common pleas of the county in which the city is situated to de-
termine the sufficiency of the cause of removal.5 4 The court of appeals
affirmed a common pleas decision which found that the cause for re-
moval was sufficient and that the appellant was accorded a fair and
impartial hearing free from prejudicial error.55 These judicial review
provisions have since been changed to permit an appeal on questions of
law and fact.58 Despite the absence of specific statutory judicial review
48. OHIo REv. CODE § 119.01 (A).
49. OHio REv. CODE § 119.12.
50. Omo Rnv. CODE § 519.15.
51. Mentor Lagoons, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Mentor Township, 168
Ohio St. 113, 151 N.E.2d 533 (1958).
52. §§ 2506.01-04.
53. OHIO REv. CODE § 2506.04. This section seems to require the reviewing court
to make findings and to affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the order, or remand the
cause to the agency involved, consistent with the findings or opinion of the court.
The similarity of this authority to that granted under § 119.12, for reviewing state
agencies, should be noted.
54. OHio REv. CODE § 143.27, Prior to 1955.
55. Jones v. Garek, 149 N.E.2d 53 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
56. OHIO REV. CODE § 143.27, as amended 126 Ohio Law 90 (1955).
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for other state and municipal employees similarly dismissed, judicial re-
view is apparently available, at least, on issues of law. The court of ap-
peals57 affirmed a common pleas decision holding that a dismissal of a
state liquor inspector who had been arrested and twice convicted for driv-
ing while under the influence of intoxicating liquor was a proper re-
moval for "failure of good behavior," under the statute. 8
Under the new point system for motor vehicle violations the registrar
of motor vehicles is required, within thirty days after the last conviction
raising the total to at least 12 points, to file an application with the
appropriate common pleas or juvenile court requesting suspension of the
person's license or permit for a period of one year. 9 An application was
filed 2 days too late in one instance. Upon motion to dismiss, the court
held that the time period was directory, not mandatory and overruled the
motion60
Several decisions construing the judicial review provisions of the
Unemployment Compensation Act stress the necessity for a strict compli-
ance with all of the procedural steps required prior to the actual appeal to
the court of common pleas.6 1 In Stewart v. The Administrator, Bureau of
Unemployment Compensation, the applicant neglected to give the requi-
site notice of intention to appeal and request a hearing. The request for
a rehearing is jurisdictional, and a failure to make it is a failure to exhaust
the administrative process, and the court of common pleas cannot acquire
jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action.62  In another case, an
applicant sought to have a letter written to the Bureau of Unemployment
Compensation stating that he had good cause for quitting his job serve
as a notice of intention to appeal and a request for a rehearing. The
common pleas court reversed the Bureau and, in this instance, ordered
a rehearing. The court of appeals, however, held that the letter was not
a proper "notice of intention" justifying the holding of a rehearing. 3
The notice of intention to appeal and request for a rehearing must be
given within 10 days from notice of the decision of the Board. This limi-
tation of time within which this last appeal before the Board (rehearing)
57. Ayers v. State Civil Service Cornm'n of Ohio, 106 Ohio App. 511, 153 N.E.2d
537 (1958).
58. Omo REv. CODE 5 143.27.
59. Omo REV. CODE 5 4507.40.
60. In re Hensley, 153 N.E.2d 539 (Ohio Corn. Pl. 1958).
61. Orno REv. CODE § 4141.28.
62. 153 N.X.2d 332 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
63. Mitchell v. State, 153 N.E.2d 341 (Ohio Ct App. 1958).
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is to be taken is jurisdictional, and a notice 64 filed longer than 10 days
afterward is ineffective.
The appeal provided from the decision of the Board on rehearing to
the court of common pleas is to determine whether the decision was un-
lawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence. Any
interested party has a right to appeal from that court's decision as in
civil cases.6 5 The proceeding in the court of common pleas is an appeal
on question of law. It is thus an error proceeding, and a motion for a
new trial after the appellate proceeding decision in the court of common
pleas is not authorized. The time for filing notice of appeal to the
court of appeals cannot be extended through the making of a motion for
a new trial. 66
Two decisions raise important questions concerning the judicial review
statute67 governing appeals from the Industrial Commission. Despite the
categorical language of the Code68 that "appeal may 'be taken from a de-
cision of a regional board from which the commission has refused to
permit an appeal to the commission," the court was of the opinion that
the act of the regional -board of review is the act of the industrial com-
mission69 and therefore a direct appeal from an adverse ruling of the
regional board of review to the court of common pleas, may be taken, 0
by-passing the additional appellate administrative review from the regional
board to the industrial commission.71
The other decision 2 held that the petition on appeal to the court
of common pleas need set forth only the "basis of jurisdiction." This was
all that the statute specifically required,73 and the court pointed out that
the issues are made up by the special appellate statute and cannot be
changed by pleading or by rearrangement of parties.
64. House v. Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, 153 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1958).
65. OHIO REV. CODE § 4141.28.
66. Abbott v. Truscon Steel Corporation, 151 N.E.2d 920 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
67. OHIo REv. CODE § 4123.519.
68. OHIO REV. CODE § 4123.519.
69. The argument was predicated upon the definition section, OHo REV. CODE
§ 4121.121 (I). But it ignores the fact that this is a general definition and would
normally give way to the rule that the statute last past is controlling in the case of
conflict. Section 4123.519 was adopted in 1957, the definition in 1955.
70. Harrison v. Scanlon, 147 N.E.2d 135 (Ohio C.P. 1958).
71. OHIo Rnv. CODE § 4123.516. This section states that the decision of a regional
board of review shall be the decision of the commission, except for purposes of ap-
peal under § 4123.519.
72. Keen v. General Motors Corp., 153 N.E.2d 347 (Ohio C.P. 1958).
73. OHIo Rnv. CODE § 4123.519.
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Mandamus
The writ of mandamus is not an available remedy for reviewing ad-
ministrative action where there is a plain and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, including equitable remedies.74 Other important
limitations have been indicated elsewhere.75 There was an unusual
number of cases invoking this method of judicial review reported during
-this period. The writ was successfully used to compel the issuance of a
building permit where the refusal had been predicated on a municipal
ordinance which the court of appeals held unconstitutional. 6 In another
case the court of appeals granted the writ to compel a -building permit
in variance of a zoning ordinance where the denial was deemed an abuse
of discretion under the circumstances. 77
Another court of appeals decision granted the writ to compel admit-
tance to a civil service examination for the office of chief of police after
a, determination of eligibility of relator as a matter of law.7s It is ap-
propriate to inquire whether mandamus is any longer available to review
similar decisions of local governmental agencies since the new appeal
provisions adopted in 1957, are availble39
The Supreme Court refused the writ to a relator who had failed to ex-
haust his administrative remedies following a denial of 'his application for
building permit80 Other examples of unsuccessful attempts to use the
writ of mandamus to secure judicial review included an effort to control
the discretion of a board of education in reaching a decision on a con-
troversial matter8l and to compel a county board of health to issue a per-
mit to operate a garbage disposal plant by means of the sanitary land
fill method when the evidence was conflicting on the issue of its satis-
factory prior operation under this same method8 2
MAURICE S. CULP
74. OHIo REv. CoD S 2731.05.
75. State v. Industrial Comm'n, 162 Ohio St. 302, 123 N.E.2d 23 (1954). See
comment, 7 WST. RES. L REV. 224 (1956).
76. State ex rel. Cadwallader v. Village of Antwerp, 104 Ohio App. 109, 146
N.E.2d 877 (1957).
77. State v. City of East Cleveland, 153 N.E.2d 177 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
78. State v. East Liverpool Civil Service Comm'n, 151 N.E.2d 592 (Ohio Ct. App.
1957).
79. OHIO RI3V. CODE 5 2506.01.
80. State v. Carlton, 168 Ohio St. 279, 154 N.E.2d 150 (1958).
81. State v. Butler County Bd. of Education, 152 N.E.2d 358 (Ohio Ct. App.
1957).
82. Radel Concrete Products, Inc. v. Clermont County Bd. of Health, 152 N.E.2d
307 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
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